Abstract: Rework has been identified as a major contributor to cost and schedule overrun in construction projects. Previous studies that have examined rework are based on a limited data sets and thus eschew generalizations being made about the key determinants. Using data from 260 completed building ͑n = 147͒ and civil engineering ͑n = 113͒ projects, path analysis is used to develop a structural model of the most significant causes of rework. The model revealed that the paths of client-directed changes, site management and subcontractors, and project communication were statistically significant contributors to rework costs. The analysis confirmed that the lack of attention to quality management resulted in higher rework costs being incurred in the projects sampled. The analysis also revealed that there were no significant differences between building and civil engineering projects in terms of the direct and indirect cost of rework experienced, and the effectiveness of the project management practices implemented. Considering the findings, it is suggested that generic strategies for reducing the incidence rework in construction and civil engineering projects can be developed.
Introduction
There has been widespread disenchantment from government and clients with the construction industry over its inability to innovate and deliver projects on schedule and to budget ͑Blake Dawson Waldron 2006; KPMG 2008͒. A major factor contributing to time and cost overruns is rework ͑Love 2002a͒. Inadvertently, it has become a problematic issue in construction and engineering projects ͑Rogge et al. 2001; Josephson et al. 2002; RobinsonFayek et al. 2004; Hwang et al. 2008; Love et al. 2008; Palaneeswaran et al. 2008͒ and often manifests as design changes and errors ͑Burati et al. 1992; Willis and Willis 1996͒ . Underlying conditions that contribute to design changes and errors are a project's structure and work practices that are implemented ͑Con-struction Industry Development Agency 1995; Busby and Hughes 2004͒ . For example, the separation of the design and production process can adversely influence the degree of constructability that is undertaken. The use of competitive tendering to obtain architectural and engineering services can led to the production of erroneous and incomplete contact documentation being produced. When a project underperforms, perhaps due to rework, it is often explained away as an isolated instance of unfortunate circumstance and considered not to be part of normal practice ͑Flyvberg et al. 2005͒ . This is because many organizations are reluctant to create any awareness, or even acknowledge that there could be problems with systems and processes in place for fear of being judged as blasé and irresponsible to stakeholders ͑Love et al. 2009͒ . Such a laissez-faire attitude may contribute to a culture of complacency being established in what is possibly a chronic malaise embedded within systems and processes becomes a norm. It is only when serious problems arise that the prevailing norms established are challenged and process improvements can be considered. For example, the collapse of the Ramsgate Walkway in the United Kingdom in 1994 resulted in a number of fatalities and injuries and as a result of trial led to significant safety reforms within the realm of engineering design ͑Chapman 1998͒. Similarly, in 2004 at Charles De Gaulle International Airport ͑Termi-nal 2E͒, a portion of the ceiling collapsed killing four people. An inquiry revealed that a number of factors that led to the collapse, in a design that had little margin for safety.
It is imperative that the incubation period within which errors and omissions intensify is reduced through the implementation of design and quality management practices such as audits, reviews, and verifications ͑Robinson-Fayek et al. 2004͒ . The longer the incubation period exists then the greater the propensity for rework to occur during the production process. The resultant rework that occurs can cause cost and schedule overruns, delays, and disruption and even lead to disputes. In recognizing the ramifications of redoing processes and activities this paper aims to explore the causal inferences of rework. Using a sample of 260 construction projects a path model is developed so as to progress theory with regards to the rework causation so that future research can focus on the production of generic mitigation and prevention strategies.
Rework: Divergence and Congruence
Terms such as quality failures, quality deviations, nonconformances, and defects have been used interchangeably under the auspices of rework ͑Love and Edwards 2004͒. There is, however, a lack of consensus as to its definition and measurement, which has resulted in significant divergence being reported in terms of its costs. For example, Ashford ͑1992͒ defines rework as "the process by which an item is made to conform to its original requirement by completion or correction." Rogge et al. ͑2001͒ define rework as "activities in the field to be done more than once in the field or activities which remove work previously installed as part of the project." The Construction Owners Association of Alberta ͑COAA͒ proffer a more specific rework definition and refer to it as the "total direct cost of redoing work in the field regardless of initiating cause" ͑Construction Owners Association of Alberta 2002͒. The COAA explicitly states that field rework does not include change orders, and errors due to off-site fabrication. Research undertaken by Love and Li ͑2000͒ revealed that change orders, particularly those of a design nature, can result in rework occurring on-site. With this in mind, Love ͑2002a͒ defined rework as "the unnecessary effort of redoing a process or activity that was incorrectly implemented the first time." The divergence that exists between definitions and the methods used to collate costs has resulted in dissimilar estimates of estimates being propagated.
There does however appear to be a degree of congruence with regard to rework causes, though many of the studies that have been undertaken are based upon limited data sets ͑Love and Ed- 
͑2008͒.
The common themes identified from these studies are scope changes, erroneous design and contract documentation, lack for formal quality management systems, and defective workmanship ͑Josephson and Hammarlund 1999; Robinson-Fayek et al. 2004; Hwang et al. 2008͒ . Additionally, the key variables that have been identified as accounting for 78% of rework costs are: scope changes initiated by clients, ineffective use of information technology to coordinate contract documentation, scope freezing, and nonimplementation of design management techniques such as value management ͑Love et al.
2004͒
The costs associated with rework have been revealed as being significant for building and civil engineering projects ͑Palaneeswaran et al. 2008͒. For example, Burati et al. ͑1992͒ reported quality deviations for engineering projects to be 12.4% of contract value with 79% of these being attributable to design changes. Abdul-Rahman ͑1997͒ identified quality failures to be 2.5 and 5% of contract value for a water-treatment plant and a highway project, respectively. Similarly, Willis and Willis ͑1996͒ found that the cost of rectifying failures in an engineering project to be 3.3%. Nylén ͑1996͒ examined quality failures in four railway projects revealed the costs of rectification to be 10% of contract value. Barber et al. ͑2000͒ found quality failures to be 16 and 23% of contract for highway projects. Yet, these estimates included an allowance for the cost of delays that were incurred. If these were removed then quality failures would amount to 6.6 and 3.6% of contract value.
Rework costs have also been found to vary significantly in building projects. Hammarlund et al. ͑1990͒ noted defects to be 5.9% of contract value in a community service building. In a later study Josephson and Hammarlund ͑1999͒ examined seven building projects and revealed defects to range from 2.3 to 9.3%. Cnudde ͑1991͒ found that nonconformance cost to be between 10 and 20% of the total project cost. Furthermore, it was reported that 46% of total deviation costs were created during design, compared to 22% for construction deviations, which were due to poor execution of work. Cusack ͑1992͒ revealed that documentation errors and no quality system in place typically increase project costs 10%. Similarly, Burroughs ͑1993͒ reported that a major Australian contractor had experienced rework costs of 5% of contract value due to design errors and omissions. Furthermore, it was found that design errors contributed to a 31% increase in a concrete subcontract package. Love and Li ͑2000͒ revealed that projects that eschewed quality assurance were likely to experience rework in excess of 5% of contract value. Though, when a quality system was used rework was found to be less than 1%. Noteworthy, it is the contractor's quality management system that acts as the mechanism for capturing design errors and omissions.
Very few design firms, while espousing their quality systems to clients, actually put them into practice ͑Rounce 1998; . This is perhaps because of the unrealistic documentation programs provided by clients to their design consultants. Moreover, procedural tasks and processes are often omitted in an attempt to minimize time and costs. Such practices result in design errors and omissions becoming ingrained within documentation, which materialize during construction. Upon identification the design consultant is required to rectify the errors, which can adversely influence productivity and fees being charged. Gardiner ͑1994͒ estimates that the cost of rectifying errors made by design consultants could be as high as 20% of their fee for a given project. According to Diekmann and Nelson ͑1985͒ design errors resulting from ambiguities in drawings and specifications can account for as much as 40% of claim costs incurred in projects.
It has been suggested that the procurement method used and project type can influence the extent of rework ͑e.g., Construction Industry Development Agency 1995͒. Contrary to this assumption, Love ͑2002a͒ has revealed that rework does not significantly vary between different procurement and project types for building projects. Love ͑2002a͒ also found that the mean total rework costs were 12% ͑direct 6.4% and indirect 5.6%͒. In one particular example, Love ͑2002b͒ found that the indirect rework costs had a multiplier effect as much as six times the actual ͑direct͒ cost of rectification.
Research Approach
According to Robinson-Fayek et al. ͑2004͒ there is no industry wide standard for measuring rework, particularly as it occurs in the field. While several tools have been developed, they all tend to be labor intensive and cumbersome to implement ͑e.g., Farrington 1987; Abdul-Rahman 1997; Low and Yeo 1998; Barber et al. 2000; Love and Irani 2003; Robinson-Fayek et al. 2004͒ . When such tools are used generalizations are not able to be made because the size of the sample is limited, which can contribute to the results being unrepresentative. To overcome this obstacle and gain an insightful understanding of rework causes and costs, an "ex-post" rework measurement tool developed by Love ͑2002a͒ is used for the purposes of this research. This research instruments scales have a high degree of reliability ͑␣Ͻ0.7͒ and validity. With minor modifications with respect to terminology, the instrument has been used by several researchers to examine rework in countries such as Hong Kong ͑e.g., Palaneeswaran et al. 2008͒.
Rework Research Instrument
The research instrument is designed to extract information about the costs, causes, and management practices implemented in a project. It comprises of the following sections and scales:
• Project characteristics-a nominal scale is used to measure project type, procurement method, and tendering method. Ratio scales were used for gross floor area and number of floors. These two variables are not used when examining projects of an engineering nature. Details about the project's contract value on practical completion, original value on the award of contract, and original and actual construction periods are measure using a ratio scale; • Organizational profile-an interval scale is used to measure organizational turnover and number of employees. A nominal scale was also used to identify the location of the firm within Australia; • Organizational management practices-a five point Likert scale is used where "1" refers to "not at all" and "5" "to a very large extent" for two constructs quality management ͑␣ = 0.71͒ and organizational learning ͑␣ = 0.81͒; • Project performance-a five point Likert scale is used where 1 refers to not at all and 5 to a very large extent with reference to specified performance ͑␣ = 0.74͒; • Rework and impact of cost and schedule-this section comprises of nine constructs and uses a five point Likert scale where 1 refers to not at all and 5 to a very large extent. The constructs are: design cost causes ͑␣ = 0.76͒, construction cost causes ͑␣ = 0.72͒, project cost source ͑␣ = 0.78͒, productivity ͑␣ = 0.85͒, client causes ͑␣ = 0.76͒, design team causes ͑␣ = 0.86͒, site management causes ͑␣ = 0.80͒, subcontractor causes ͑␣ = 0.83͒, communication ͑␣ = 0.84͒, and contract documentation ͑␣ = 0.75͒.
• Management of the project-this section examines the extent to which procurement ͑e.g., relationship contracting͒ and design management ͑e.g., constructability͒ practices are implemented on the project using a five point Likert scale where 1 refers to not at all and 5 to a very large extent. For the purposes of this research the operational definition for rework propagated by Love ͑2002a͒ is adopted. The instrument is modified to accommodate differences in procurement methods and project types in order to sample civil engineering projects.
Sample Selection
Stratified random sampling was used to select the study sample from the telephone directory, Yellow Pages for the various regions of Australia. Two main benefits can be derived from using a stratified sample: 1. A stratified sample can ensure that adequate and representative respondents within each subgroup under study are acquired. 2. Stratification also ensures that respondents within the same group are homogeneous. Before the sample size for the main study could be determined, a pilot survey was completed with 30 building and 20 civil engineering contractors. Because the survey of building contractors was undertaken first, it was considered to be reliable, the instrument was used to pilot the civil engineering survey. The firms sampled comprised of design and engineering consultants, project managers, and contractors. The rationale was to test the suitability, clarity, and comprehensibility of the questionnaire as well as measure the response rate. Participating firms were contacted by telephone and informed of the research aims and objectives and informed that all responses would remain strictly confidential; albeit, generalizations of the findings would be made available to all participants.
On participant consent, questionnaires were mailed to the sample, with a stamped addressed return envelope enclosed. Participants were invited to critically review the questionnaires' design and structure by annotating comments onto the document itself in order to provide invaluable feedback. Comments received were positive and therefore the questionnaire remained largely unaltered for the main surveys; albeit a few minor layout changes were made to increase clarity.
A total of 25 responses were received in the building project pilot survey, giving an 83% response rate. For the civil engineering project survey, a total of 17 responses were received, giving an 85% response rate. These high response rates were obtained because prior consent to support the work was obtained from all survey participants.
In the main survey, 420 and 300 questionnaires were distributed to design consultants, contractors and project managers for building and civil engineering projects, respectively. A total of 136 valid responses for building projects were received and 96 for civil engineering projects from the main survey. As there were no fundamental changes required to either of the pilot questionnaires they were added to the samples. For the building and civil engineering projects, 161 and 115 responses were received respectively, which represents a total consolidated response rate of 36% for both surveys. Alreck and Settle ͑1985͒ argue that this response rate is within an acceptable range for a survey focusing on gaining responses from industry practitioners.
Data Reliability
Data reliability relates to data source and the identification of the position held by the respondent completing the questionnaire ͑Oppenheim 1992͒. Therefore, it was critically important that only selected senior personnel who had detailed knowledge about the procurement processes associated with a project answered the questionnaire. From the total responses gathered, 133 respondents provided information relating to their individual job position and title and it was revealed that most respondents held senior positions within their organizations. Based upon this finding the direct mailing to individuals in organizations seemed to have achieved its objective of reaching senior staff that plays a significant role in the construction project management. In addition, because the research design mailed questionnaires to organizations in different States in Australia, the risk of duplicating projects was minimized.
Data Screening
Prior to exploratory factor analysis, the assumptions related to data, normality, outliers, linearity, multicollinearity and singularity, and factorability of the bivariate correlation matrix were inspected. Eight univariate outliers ͑two on Item 7; five on Item 8; and one on Item 12͒ were detected and deleted accordingly ͑Tabachnick and Fidell 2007͒. Mahalanobis distance identified eight multivariate outliers, which were deleted. A reexamination for univariate and multivariate outliers showed no new extreme cases. Normality and linearity within the data set was considered satisfactory. There was no multicollinearity and the KaiserMeyer-Olkin ͑KMO͒ statistic indicated that the correlation matrix was appropriate for factor analysis ͑KMO= 0.77͒. Assumptions for subsequent analyses were tested and are reported below.
Analysis
Using the data derived from the questionnaire survey an exploratory factor analysis was conducted to identify the latent constructs underlying the rework measures and to generate a more parsimonious set of variables for subsequent analysis. The Guttman ͑1954͒ eigenvalue greater-than-one criteria and a visual inspection of the scree plot ͑Cattel 1966͒ were used to determine the number of factors. Reliability of the scales was inspected using Cronbach's ␣ and item-total correlations. Factors identified were submitted to a path analysis to predict variance in construction project rework. Path analysis is primarily used to understand comparative strengths of direct and indirect relationships among a set of variables. Hence, path analysis is unique from other linear equation models. In path analysis mediated pathways ͑those acting through a mediating variable, i.e., "Y," in the pathway X → Y → Z͒ can be examined. Pathways in path models represent hypotheses of researchers, and can never be statistically tested for directionality.
Path analysis is a subset of structural equation modeling ͑SEM͒, the multivariate procedure that "allows examination of a set of relationships between one or more independent variables, either continuous or discrete, and one or more dependent variables, either continuous or discrete" ͑Ullman 1996͒. SEM represents a hybrid combination of multiple regression and factor analysis and deals with measured and latent variables. A measured variable ͑also known as observed, indicators, or manifest variables͒ is a variable that can be observed directly and is measurable. A latent variable ͑also known as factor, construct, or unobserved variable͒ is a variable that cannot be observed directly and must be inferred from measured variables. Latent variables are implied by the covariances among two or more measured variables. Path analysis deals only with measured variables. Subsequent analysis was undertaken to test for differences in perceived causes of rework among civil and building projects. Oneway analysis of variance ͑ANOVA͒ with Bonferroni corrections for multiple testing was applied. All analyses were two-tailed and evaluated at a 0.05␣ level unless otherwise indicated.
Results
There were a wide variety of building and civil engineering projects sampled ͑Table 1͒. In the case of building projects these range from a bank to hotels. For the civil engineering sample these ranged from tunneling to road construction and sewer treatment plants. The summary statistics reveal that the average original contract value was A$23,142,486 ͑SDϭ$41,171,772; minimumϭ$132,347; maximumϭ$390 M͒ and the average actual value on completion was A$25,455,372 ͑SDϭ$45,090,928; minimumϭ$136,671; maximumϭ$420 M͒. The actual construction period was an average 4.7 years ͑SDϭ3.3 years͒, ranging from 3 months to 3.75 years.
To better understand the makeup of the sample, an examination of respondent stratification, geographical dispersion, and company turnover was completed for the civil engineering sample. In terms of respondent stratification, 45% were design consultants ͑architects, quantity surveyors, and structural, mechanical, and electrical engineers͒, 31% were contractors, and 24% comprised project managers. With regards to geographical dispersion, organizations were situated across states: Victoria ͑45%͒, New South Wales ͑17%͒, Queensland ͑27%͒, South Australia ͑9%͒, and Western Australia ͑2%͒. The analysis revealed that the average annual turnover of organizations sampled varied: Ͻ$1 Mϭ14%; $1-10 Mϭ37%; $11-50 Mϭ20%; $51-250 Mϭ13%; and Ͼ$250 Mϭ16%. The overall number of people employed by organizations was found to be: Ͻ10ϭ18%; 10-30 ϭ20%; 31-50ϭ21%; 51-100ϭ14%; Ͼ100ϭ27%. The combined sample of 276 was reduced to 260 after univariate and multivariate outliers were deleted from the combined data set.
Exploratory Factor Analysis
The 58 items for the total sample of construction projects ͑n = 260͒ were submitted to a principal components analysis using orthogonal ͑varimax͒ rotation with Kaiser normalization ͑Table 2͒. Orthogonal rotation was employed to minimize the correlations between factors, and to generate simple, separate subscales ͑Floyd and Widaman 1995͒. The analysis generated 16 factors with eigenvalues greater-than-one. The eigenvalue cutoff is rarely adequate and may generate conceptually vague, uninterpretable results ͑Floyd and Widaman 1995͒. Therefore, a scree plot was consulted ͑refer to Fig. 1͒ .
The scree plot suggested a six-factor solution, which accounted for 48.85% of the variance. This solution was adopted as it was more parsimonious. The six factors were: 1. Site management and subcontracting ͑20.50% and 9 items͒; 2. Project communication ͑11.20% and 5 items͒; 3. Contract documentation ͑5.35% and 6 items͒; Table 3 . To be included on a scale, items were required to load above 0.40 on a factor and to not load strongly on any other factor. Two items were excluded from the solution as they were not conceptually consistent with apparent scale themes and had low loadings of 0.41͑Items 21 and 24͒.
Following derivation of the factors, item-keying direction within and across scales was homogenized, as higher scores always represented good project management practices. This involved recoding all items on-site management and subcontracting ͑Items 34-42͒, project planning and resourcing ͑Items 53-56, and 58͒, design time management ͑Items 19, 25, and 29-31͒, and client-directed changes ͑Items 2, 9, and 10͒, and Items 26 and 27 from contract documentation. Scale scores were generated by summing individual items and computing an average score. The total score ranged from 1 to 5. Mean scores and standard deviations for each subscale are displayed in Table 4 .
Reliability
Reliability analysis was conducted on the six scales. Cronbach ␣ ͑␣͒ coefficients for each scale were found to be highly reliable ͑␣ = 0.88 for site management and subcontracting; ␣ = 0.86 for project communication, ␣ = 0.84 for contract documentation, ␣ = 0.84 for project planning and resourcing, ␣ = 0.83 for design time management, ␣ = 0.80 for client-directed changes͒. Corrected item-total correlations were as follows: site management and subcontracting ͑0.86 to 0.87͒, project communication ͑0.54 to 0.74͒, contract documentation ͑0.47 to 0.76͒, project planning and resourcing ͑0.55 to 0.76͒, design time management ͑0.58 to 0.68͒, and client-directed changes ͑0.53 to 0.73͒. These coefficients indicate that the individual items are associated with their respective subscales and are greater than the minimum rule of thumb of 0.2 ͑Kline 1986͒.
Path Analysis
Path analysis was conducted to determine the strength of the relationship between the six project management factors ͑exo- Negative path coefficients indicate that ineffective quality project management practices are associated with a higher amount of rework. Unstandardized coefficients were Ϫ2.186 ͑p = 0.039͒ for site management and subcontracting, Ϫ2.015 ͑p = 0.047͒ for project communication, Ϫ1.374 ͑p = 0.177͒ for contract documentation, 0.621 ͑p = 0.559͒ for project planning Comparisons between the civil ͑n = 113͒ and building ͑n = 147͒ projects were undertaken. Descriptive statistics for all comparisons are displayed in Table 5 . One-way ANOVAs were conducted to determine whether civil and building projects differed in degree of rework. For all analyses, the dependent variable was rework cost expressed as a proportion of the original contract value. There were no significant differences between civil and building projects in cost of indirect rework ͓F͑1 , 258͒ = 1.42, p = 0.23͔ or total rework ͓F͑1 , 258͒ = 0.621, p = 0.43͔. The homogeneity of variance assumption was violated for the direct rework comparison, hence the results of a t test with equal variances not assumed is reported. There was no significant difference in direct rework cost, t͑256͒ = −1.22, p = 0.225.
Next, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to determine whether there were variations in the effectiveness of project management practices between civil and building projects. Assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance were satisfied. A Bonferroni correction for multiple testing was applied, modifying the per test ␣ level to 0.0083. Civil and building construction projects did not differ in quality of site management and subcontracting, F͑1, 258͒ = 0.518, p = 0.47; project communication, F͑1,258͒ = 0.04, p = 0.83; contract documentation, F͑1,258͒ = 0.28, p = 0.59 ; project planning and resourcing, F͑1,258͒ = 0.52, p = 0.47; design management, F͑1,258͒ = 0.56, p = 0.45; and client-directed changes, F͑1,258͒ = 0.028, p = 0.56.
Discussion
The large sample size enabled the research instrument developed by Love ͑2002a͒ to examine the causal constructs in detail. It was revealed from the factor analysis that the research instrument could in the future be recalibrated to account for the six factors identified. However, the instrument has demonstrated that is a reliable measure to use and for the purposes of this research has aided the identification of key causal variables. The findings confirm previous research that changes initiated by clients are the major determinant of rework. Such "changes," as noted in Table 3 , were revealed to be initiated because of errors and omissions in documentation, or after work ͑process or product͒ had already been undertaken on-site. Involving the client actively in the design process may overcome the difficulties often encountered when developing a project brief and identifying priorities. Where possible the use of visualization technology could be used to reduce the incidence of change and eliminate unnecessary field rework ͑Josephson et al. 2002͒. Accordingly, the research has demonstrated when performance and quality requirements are made explicit to the project team and contract conditions are strictly adhered to then rework can be reduced. What inevitably happens however in construction projects is that when tie and budget constraints are imposed procedures are not followed and so the likelihood of rework significantly increases ͑Love et al.
͑2009͒.
With respect to errors and omissions, design consultants ͑such as architects and engineers͒ are expected to use reasonable and ordinary care in the practice of their profession and their responsibilities are in part defined by social ascription ͑Grunwald 2001͒. From a legal perspective this is well known among the professions, but clients are not always aware or made of aware of this ͑Guckert and King 2002͒. Architects and engineers cannot guarantee the results of their service. Their liability for errors and omissions, however, can be "determined by whether they have performed their services with the standard of care consistent with other professional designers within their community" ͑Guckert and King 2002͒. Once clients are aware of their designer's obligation they often find it difficult to comprehend what is meant by standard of care ͑Chapman 1998͒. Usually this is left up to a court of law or a panel of experts once a breach of the standard of care is identified, but this can be a long and tedious process for clients with no guarantee of a successful outcome ͑e.g., Chapman 1998͒. Even when a standard of care is agreed upon precontract, any financial recovery may hinge on whether the mistake was an error ͑mistakes made by the designer͒ or omission ͑omitted from the contract͒. A particularly difficult issue to determine relates to what management practice that should have been implemented to prevent errors or omissions from occurring in the first place. Rounce ͑1998͒ has suggested that architects specifically lack procedures to control the design process and generally do not implement activities that assure conformance. Because design firms have been reluctant to adhere to quality management principles they simply do not know what the causes and costs of rework are to them and others in the supply chain. Errors and omissions will continue to occur in documentation unless design firms focus on developing error containment and reduction strategies. There is currently a "labor skills" shortage being experienced in Australia and this has had a profound impact on the ability of design consultants, contractors and subcontractors to obtain appropriately qualified personnel ͑Koshy et al. Melbourne Institute 2008͒ . This would account for "low skill level" and factors inadequate managerial and supervisory skills being identified as a contributor to rework. In addition, there has been considerable staff turnover being experienced as qualified staff are being offered significant remuneration packages to join competing firms. There appears to be no immediate solution available to overcome the skills shortage and is something that Australian State Governments are working hard to remedy. When rework occurs on-site there is a greater propensity for safety to be compromised as attention focuses on correcting works ͑Love et al. 2004͒ . With a shortage of people with appropriate managerial and supervisory skills contractors need to become increasingly vigilant about not overstretching themselves in order to ensure the most qualified people are available for the projects that they deliver. Notwithstanding this prevailing situation contractors need to be proactive in adhering to their developed project quality management plans and supervising the installation of works.
Conclusions
Rework is a perennial problem within the construction industry. Research into this problem has attracted extensive academic attention in recent years but the sample sizes have been small and thus such generalizations have been questionable. Unlike previous studies conducted, this research was based upon a comprehensive data set of both building and civil engineering projects in Australia. Using path analysis to develop a generic structural model, the research revealed that the paths of client-directed changes, site management and subcontractors, and project communication were significant contributors to rework costs. Considering the sample size and research rigour, the findings presented are dependable and credible. The research has reconfirmed the importance of quality management since projects that failed to meet a minimum benchmark level of quality incurred a higher incidence of rework. Noteworthy, the research reveals, there is no significant difference between civil engineering and construction projects in terms of the direct and indirect cost of rework experienced, and factors causing rework. This finding alone establishes the need for future research work to focus on developing generic strategies for managing both types of projects. Perhaps more important, the research presented has revealed that although researchers successfully uncover pieces of the rework puzzle, industry continues to be plagued by rework. A myriad of factors could be responsible for this observed failure and so future research should now focus more on mitigation and less on causation.
